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RENEGOTIATING RESPONSIBILITY
AFTER APARTHEID:
LISTENING TO PERPETRATOR TESTIMONY
MARK SANDERS*
On July 14, 1997, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission met for a
public hearing in Cape Town, South Africa.1 The Commission allowed
five former African National Congress cadres to question Captain Jeffrey
Benzien regarding his application for amnesty for acts of killing and
torture. Since the 1980s Captain Benzien had been a member of the Cape
Town Security Police and was notorious for his methods of torture. His
questioners—Tony Yengeni, Ashley Forbes, Gary Kruser, Peter Jacobs,
and Bongani Jonas—had been tortured by him while in police custody.
Now they were demanding that Captain Benzien describe, even enact
before the Commission, the techniques he applied during interrogation.
South Africa and the world watched as Jeffrey Benzien simulated the “wet
bag” torture method, where a water-soaked bag is placed over the head of
the victim to induce suffocation.
Like a handful of other occasions at which victims faced perpetrators,2
the hearing instantly became a Truth Commission touchstone. As in the
*
Assistant Professor, Department of English and American Literature, Brandeis
University; Ph.D., 1998, M.A., 1992, Columbia University; B.A. (Hons.), 1990, University
of Cape Town.
1 . See Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Amnesty Hearing, July 14, 1997
(interview of Jeffrey Benzien), available athttp://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/
ct3/benzien.htm [hereinafter Benzien Hearing]. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
was established at the end of 1995 to uncover and record gross human rights violations of
the apartheid era in South Africa. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission, at
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/index.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2002). Its mandate included
restoring the civil and human dignity of victims by allowing them to testify to violations
done to them, and recommending measures of reparation. The Commission was also
empowered to grant amnesty from criminal and civil prosecution to perpetrators in return
for full disclosure of violations committed by them, provided the acts in question were
connected to, and commensurate with, a political goal.
2 . The Saint James Church and Heidelberg Tavern attackers and the killers of Amy
Biehl are other examples. See generally Truth & Reconcilation Comm’n, Amnesty Hearing
Transcripts 1997, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/
amntrans/am1997.htm.
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other instances, the quasi-juridical — or from another point of view,
“legalistic” — conventions governing the hearings were violated.3
However, in the Benzien case, the commentators were more specific about
the nature and significance of the transgression. At last the roles were
reversed and “the torturer . . . was confronted by the tortured.”4
Other observers regard the events that unfolded at Benzien’s hearing in a
less favorable light. For instance, Antjie Krog, who covered the Truth
Commission’s hearings for South African Broadcasting Corporation radio,
wrote the following about the proceedings:
Initially the body language of the tortured was clear: “No one else
counts, not the Amnesty Committee, not the lawyers, not the audience—
what counts today is you and me. And we sit opposite each other, just
like ten years ago. Except that I am not at your mercy—you are at mine.
And I will ask you the questions that have haunted me ever since. “ But
5
it isn’t that easy.

The voice of Tony Yengeni, a member of Parliament, “has become
known for its tone of confidence—sometimes tinged with arrogance,” but
now “sounds strangely different—his voice somehow choked.”6 Then
there are the questions that Captain Benzien asks, which have the effect of
turning the tables again and putting the victims at the perpetrator’s mercy.
Having made Benzien demonstrate the “wet bag,” Krog observes,
“Yengeni has to pay dearly. Back at the table, Benzien quietly turns on
him and with one accurate blow, shatters Yengeni’s political profile right
across the country. ‘Do you remember, Mr. Yengeni, that within thirty
minutes you betrayed Jennifer Schreiner? Do you remember pointing out
Bongani Jonas to us on the highway?’”7
Benzien then proceeded to testify about the “special relationship” he
3 . In a compilation of SABC radio coverage of the Commission released in 2000, the
Benzien hearing is presented as follows:
Surviving victims of gross human rights abuses continued to steer the Truth
Commission’s Amnesty Committee into uncharted territory in mid-July 1997.
Until then, the amnesty script was predominantly couched in legalities, with only
judges and lawyers jogging the memories of both perpetrator and victim. But all
this changed during the amnesty hearing of former Western Cape security
policeman Captain Jeff Benzien.
SOUTH AFRICA ’S HUMAN SPIRIT vol. 3, disc 1, track 8 (South African Broadcasting Corp.
2000), available at http://www.sabctruth.co.za/worlds.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2001); see
also ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED 252-53 (2000) (noting that, among the
Commissioners, there was sometimes a discomfort with departures from “judicial”
procedure).
4 . See Truth Commission Special Report (SABC television broadcast, July 20, 1997)
(quoting Max du Preez’s summation in his weekly television wrap-up).
5 . A NTJIE K ROG , COUNTRY O F M Y SKULL: G UILT, SORROW, AND THE LIMITS OF
FORGIVENESS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 93 (2nd ed. 1999).
6 . Id.
7 . Id. at 93-94.
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claimed he shared with Ashley Forbes: “You, I can remember especially
because I think that the two of us . . . really became quite close . . . I may
be mistaken, but I would say relatively good friends in a way . . . . Do you
remember the time when you saw snow for the first time?”8 As Krog
observes, “[a] torturer’s success depends on his intimate knowledge of the
human psyche. Benzien is a connoisseur. Within the first few minutes, he
manages to manipulate most of his victims back into the roles of their
previous relationship—where he has the power and they the fragility.”9
Yazir Henry, another Western Cape cadre tortured by the Security
Police, echoes Krog’s observations. Henry writes that the decision to grant
Jeffrey Benzien amnesty “will remain unpopular and continue to be
contested and widely regarded as illegitimate.”10 Henry states further that
not only does “the community” perceive that “[Benzie n] did not make full
disclosure and [that] his actions were disproportionate to his political
motivation,” thus disqualifying him from amnesty under the Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act,11 but that:
He also showed very little remorse and in some ways, because of his
attitude, continued to torture Yengeni and Forbes in his appearance
before the Commission. He asked Yengeni to remember how he gave up
not only his arms but also his comrade Bongani Jonas without the
security police having to lay a finger on him. He asked Forbes to tell the
audience that he (Benzien) had not only brought him ice cream and
books but also broke bread with him and played with him in the snow
during his detention.
I remember asking myself how a process that was supposed to be
holding him accountable for his brutal and systematic torture of people
could go so horribly wrong. I struggled with my anger and resolved not
to participate in any further amnesty proceedings—even though I knew
that the people responsible for torturing and nearly killing me would
apply for amnesty. I realised that the amnesty process was hampering
my own efforts to deal with the trauma of capture, detention and the
obligation to watch a comrade and friend die in front of me as a result of
12
the police opening fire with guns and hand grenades.

Common to Antjie Krog’s and Yazir Henry’s accounts of what happened
at the Benzien hearing is the perception that the “process . . . [went]
8 . Benzien Hearing, supra note 1, at 51/184 (No page numbers were found in the text
of the hearing, therefore, for citation of the transcript, the author has relied on the pagination
generated by his web-browser and printer software, which paginates the document 1-184).
9 . K ROG , supra note 5, at 95.
10 . YAZIR H ENRY , Where Healing Begins, in LOOKING BACK , REACHING FORWARD :
REFLECTIONS ON THE T RUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 171
(Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000).
11 . Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995.
12 . H ENRY , supra note 10, at 171.
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horribly wrong.”13 The intuition guiding each of their versions is that the
way in which the proceedings unfolded returned Yengeni, Forbes and the
others to the time of the offense for which Benzien was applying for
amnesty. Krog notes, “[w]ithin the first few minutes he manages to
manipulate most of his victims back into the roles of their previous
relationship — where he has the power and they the fragility.”14 As Henry
reported, “[h]e . . . in some ways . . . continued to torture Yengeni and
Forbes and others in his appearance before the Commission.”15 For Henry,
the exchange with Benzien is not limited to the re-injury of those directly
involved. The exchange with Benzien takes him, as a member of the
audience, back to when he was detained and tortured, and the complicated
events that ensued. There is a sense to be gained from both Krog and
Henry, that for the good of the victim, a return to, or a continuation of, the
offense ought not to take place. Or, at the very least, not with the
perpetrator.
But is such a return not what Max du Preez celebrates in Truth
Commission Special Report?16 Is it not what Du Preez, and Krog, although
Krog does not celebrate it, sense that Yengeni and the others seek from
Benzien? By reversing roles and asking Benzien questions, are they, in
effect, not continuing the contest begun ten years before, so that they can
wrest control of the situation from Benzien, and retrospectively gain the
upper hand? If this is their game, it is a hazardous one. Du Preez declares
the questioners the winners, but Krog and Henry dissent. The five
confronting Benzien are like assault victims of a professional boxer
entering the ring one by one to get their own back. Common sense tells us
that a subpoena will deprive the boxer of none of his advantage over his
victims. To the extent that one can even speak of victory going to either
party, if Benzien, the practiced torturer has won the first bout, what reason
do we have to think that he should lose the rematch?
Such considerations lie behind the regular conduct of the Truth
Commission’s public proceedings, which include a separation of the
victim’s human rights violation hearing from the perpetrator’s amnesty
hearing. Additionally, cross-examination at amnesty hearings is typically
restricted to victims’ lawyers.17 As a quasi-juridical body linking forensic

13 .
14 .
15 .
16 .
17 .

Id.
KROG, supra note 5, at 95.
HENRY , supra note 10, at 171.
See Truth Commission Special Report, supra note 4.
See DESMOND MPILO T UTU , NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 176-78 (1999)
(explaining that the Commission’s precautions against victims having to confront
perpetrators at hearings were balanced by its preparedness to arrange voluntary meetings
between victims and perpetrators at other venues).
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truth-seeking and rehabilitative telling, 18 the Truth Commission reveals the
extent to which such provisions for mediation and the problems of
responsibility they seek to address are a shared concern of law and
psychoanalysis.
The hearing displays, in psychoanalytic terms, the phenomenon of
“transference.” Transference is a way of staging in the present a past set of
experiences, and is an alternative to direct confrontation with figures who
are linked to traumatic events.19 Sigmund Freud describes transferences in
the following manner:
Transferences are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and
phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of
the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for
their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the
physician. To put it another way: a whole series of psychological
experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to
20
the person of the physician at the present mo ment.

Two aspects of Freud’s account are relevant here: the transposition of
figures and the assimilation of temporalities.21 The process of repetition,
acting out, and working through, the components of the therapeutic cure,
depends upon this nexus. In a similar way, the Truth Commission makes
use of this process, or a part of it, through human rights violation hearings,
which are designed to fulfill a mandate of “restor[ing] the human and civil
dignity of the victims.”22 In the absence of perpetrators willing to come
forward, the Commission assumes responsibility 23 for the violation(s) of
the perpetrator.
The perpetrator does not testify at the human rights violation hearing.
Further, amnesty-seekers are typically cross-examined not by the victims
themselves but by their legal representatives, and then usually only in cases
where the victims are withholding their support for the amnesty
application. The process is mediated, as in the therapeutic situation, and
the return to the time of the offense is managed by proxy. This is how the
18 . See generally Mark Sanders, Truth, Telling, Questioning: The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull, and Literature after
Apartheid, 46.1 M ODERN FICTION STUDIES 13-41 (Spring 2000), available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modern_fiction_studies/v046/46.1sanders.html.
19 . See J. LAPLANCHE & J.B. PONTALIS, T HE LANGUAGE OF PSYCHO-A NALYSIS 455-64
(1973).
20 . Sigmund Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (“Dora”), in CASE
HISTORIES I 157-58 (Pelican Freud Library ed., 1977) (1905).
21 . See id.
22 . T RUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. A FR., 1 T RUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 112 n.6 (1998).
23 . See id. at vol. 5, 170-71 (explaining that this method of assuming responsibility is
essential to counterbalance amnesty).
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law endeavors to contain and limit the inevitable repetition of the offense.
To a certain extent, we, as interdisciplinary scholars of law, want things
to go awry, to “go wrong.” When operating boundaries are transgressed
and quasi-juridical conventions are renegotiated, other dimensions of
responsibility may be broached. Once that takes place, however, one
cannot anticipate what will unfold. One would not want to say
categorically that a confrontation between the parties themselves is
detrimental to the victim or, indeed, to the perpetrator, but the attendant
risks are unavoidable. It seems clear that, in the case of Benzien’s amnesty
hearing, if we accept Yazir Henry’s account, the process does “go horribly
wrong” because there takes place a direct confrontation. 24 Returning both
parties to the time of the offense renders the victim vulnerable again. This
is what Yazir Henry senses, although I would not agree that the process
“goes horribly wrong” simply “because of [Benzien’s] attitude.”25 The
attitude of his questioners also takes a hand. More is required to manage
the situation, so that the trauma is not simply repeated, but is also worked
through. Ashley Forbes’s comment, in the same installment of Truth
Commission Special Report, that he did not seek counseling is perhaps a
revealing one. Forbes, along with Yengeni and the others, not only
eschews the Commission’s safeguards but rejects another available
mechanism for reparative telling and listening. The tortured refuse the
paths of mediation offered by both psychoanalysis (albeit in the weak sense
represented by psychological counseling), and the law. This is what is at
stake when we ask whether the “legalities” of the process ought to be
abandoned, or, admit improvised modifications such as Yengeni and the
others set in motion, and which some have uncritically celebrated—while
Yazir Henry walks away from a hearing which is no longer an amnesty
hearing but a human rights violation hearing, except that it is not just tales
of the past being told, but new violations that are being committed.
Could the critical picture I am presenting be motivated by an
unacknowledged impulse to lay down the law in order to disavow an
unavoidable risk? Or, worse still, by a compulsion to keep the victim in the
position of victim (one famously analyzed by Freud in “‘A Child is Being
Beaten’”)?26 How else, though, might one frame an analysis of the Benzien
hearing? As interdisciplinary minds attuned and sympathetic to a crossing
of boundaries and a transgression of rules, we have, nevertheless, to ask,
once quasi-juridical mediation has been given up, whether any other
24 . See H ENRY , supra note 10, at 171.
25 . Id.
26 . See 17 SIGMUND FREUD , ‘A Child is Being Beaten’ — A Contribution to the Study of

the Origin of Sexual Perversions, in T HE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 175-204 (James Strachey & Anna Freud trans.
& eds., 1974).
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dimension of responsibility has in fact been broached. That remains the
criterion. Such an event cannot be anticipated, but may perhaps be isolated
and analyzed after all is said and done.
Rather than arriving at definite conclusions, I propose that if one combs
the transcript of the hearing, it may be possible to find beyond a simple
repetition and reversal of roles, an amendment of conduct. The focus of
critical commentary has been on the struggle between Benzien and his
victims (and whether victory goes to either side), Benzien’s attitude, or
whether such a contest ought, for the welfare of those involved, to have
been staged in the first place. There are elements in Benzien’s testimony,
however, which not only augment our understanding of the relationship
between torturer and tortured and its durability (which I read Krog to have
in mind when she writes that “it isn’t that easy”), but also suggest
something else. Clearly, Yengeni and the others conduct themselves as if
they want something from Benzien besides his amnesty application; if not
revenge exactly, at least a further set of admissions. Beyond that, they
want him to submit to them and their interrogation. If this is so, Benzien
responds, as Krog observes, by getting back at Yengeni and the others.
Once the game is on, generally speaking he will not allow them to get the
upper hand. 27
But, there are moments of a different quality. There are, first of all,
occasions when Benzien apologizes (Ek vra om verskoning), or asks for
forgiveness for what he did. 28 Another set of remarks relate directly to the
repetition going on at the hearing. Although Benzien frequently responds
to his questioners with questions and statements that render them
vulnerable,29 he also, on at least two occasions reflected by the transcript,
desists from this pattern, reining himself in when he is about to launch into
an interrogation: “As a matter of interest, I think I should stop here, and
just answer his [Jonas’s] question . . . . Mr. Jacobs, I don’t know what
position you hold in the Security Branch now, but do you—okay you are
asking me the questions.”30 Benzien’s restraint may simply be out of
respect for, or deference to, the authority of the court of law. As a police
veteran, he has testified many times, and as the Commission observes,
much leeway is being granted to the others who must be guided in their

27 . There is also the question of the procedures for the amnesty hearing and their basis:
if amnesty is a conditional “forgetting,” is it just that the perpetrator has to “return” to or
“re-enact” a past situation, in which, as Benzien does, he/she might find him/herself
committing further violations?
28 . See Benzien Hearing, supra note 1, at 2, 116/184.
29 . See, e.g., id. at 24, 25, 36ff, 39f, 43, 50, 53f, 56, 63, 66, 67, 85, 88, 109, 119 &
140/184.
30 . Id. at 121, 139/184.
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cross-examination. 31 These moments may, however, ultimately elude the
framework of the law.
When we ask whether there will have been responsibility, we look for a
reinvention rather than a mechanical application of rules.32 If the first thing
we notice about Benzien’s hearing is the unanticipated interrogation of
Benzien by his victims, perhaps we can, once new rules governing the time
of the offense as it is reenacted have been put in place, in turn observe a
reinvention on the part of Benzien. Given that what we are witnessing is
indeed, as Krog and Henry suspect, a repetition or continuation of the old
situation, for Benzien to have responded by becoming the interrogator all
over again may have been the least unexpected outcome. Benzien himself
keeps saying, with reference to his shooting of cadre Ashley Kriel, that “the
tables could have been turned.”33 To have responded in any other way
would have been exceptional. Yet there are times where he appears to act
otherwise, and the pattern of compulsive or compelled behavior is, if not
broken, significantly interrupted.
Let us assume that Benzien is not simply upholding the rules of conduct
governing amnesty hearings, which are progressively relaxed when he is
cross-examined. It may then be that in those places where he desists from
questioning, Benzien is, as much as his questioners, attempting to work
things out with the others without the aid of the Commission as mediator.
As observed, once Yengeni and the others take it upon themselves to
question Benzien, they abdicate the Commission’s mediation and its
preparedness to appear as their proxy. Benzien’s response is, in general, to
turn the tables on them and to become their interrogator once more. When
he appeals to the Commission’s rules in order not to question his
questioners, he is, I propose, no longer simply availing himself of the
“transference” offered by the Commission, but may instead be acting as his
own proxy for the old Jeffrey Benzien. It is hardly surprising that these
fleeting moments elude the memory of the hearing of the ones questioning.
Like Ashley Forbes’s excursion to the snows of the hinterland, these
moments do not detract from the overall experience of past and renewed
violation. It remains, nevertheless, to weigh them, if not for what they are,
then for what they could have been. If one thing they might indicate is a
mending of ways commonly thought to be a condition of forgiveness, and
thus a practical asking by Benzien of forgiveness, in this case, I do not
31 . See id. at 127/184.
32 . See generally Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of

Authority,” 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919, 967 (1990) (stating that responsibility involves more
than simply invoking a rule, and that responsible decision, strictly speaking, entails acting in
the absence of any known rule).
33 . Benzien Hearing, supra note 1, at 8/184 (reporting that Benzien testified regarding
the shooting of Kriel before being questioned by the five victims).
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know, and perhaps cannot ultimately know, what they are, even as I sense
that they, like the questions posed by his victims, are something other,
something more, than a “legalistic” ploy or gesture.
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